conversation between Executive Editor Shishir Gupta And Senior anchor Ayesha Verma Hindustan Times’s “Point Blank” paints a clear picture: The Middle East war may be stalling, but none of the key strategic questions around Iran, energy security, Israel’s future, or the Indo-Pacific balance of power have been resolved.
A “deal” with Iran that’s still no deal
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to India comes with a bold claim: that a deal between Washington and Tehran is “imminent” and that the US will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Yet, as Gupta underlines, nothing gets done unless it’s on paper – and by that standard, the deal remains elusive.
The core problem is the gap between what each side wants. For President Donald Trump, who is pushing forward with a “Make America Great Again” agenda, any arrangement deemed softer than Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal would look like a strategic defeat, especially over Iran’s nuclear program and its behavior around it. strait of hormuz. For Iran, the goal is exactly the opposite: to maintain its nuclear advantage and the ability to weaponize choke points like Hormuz without conceding core security interests.
War averted, objectives not accomplished
Gupta says the immediate threat of full-scale war has diminished; “No one really wants to fight” after months of tension in the Gulf. But the reduction in war risk has not translated into achievement of Washington’s core military objectives.
Two major objectives drove the US–Israel stance:
- Iran’s “nuclear defense” – forcing Tehran to surrender its enriched uranium and retreat from weapons limits.
- Ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – the artery of global oil supply.
The outcome is unclear on both fronts. Sanctions relief, resumption of oil exports to Iran, and macroeconomic normalization – what Gupta calls “Part Two” of the process – all depend on a credible resolution of “Part One”: the nuclear question, followed by concrete arrangements around Hormuz. Those conditions have not been met, while rhetoric about an imminent deal has intensified.
Why does India need clarity, not ambiguity?
For India, the stakes are clear and largely economic. New Delhi is not invested in the ideological framework of victory or defeat; it Wants low oil prices and predictable energy flows.
Gupta emphasizes that India’s “fundamental interest is absolutely that oil prices should be low,” as high crude oil is already “severely impacting the economy.” Unlike China, which can access multiple alternative sources and enjoy greater leverage in global energy markets, India faces acute constraints in securing oil, LPG and LNG at affordable rates. This is why New Delhi is advocating for a concrete, enforceable agreement between the US and Iran and peace across the Gulf so that regional states are not directly targeted by Tehran.
Energy security here is not an abstract concept; It is directly related to inflation, fiscal position and the broader stability of the global economy. A durable order in the Middle East would help restore some predictability, which India considers essential for its development path.
Danger of “vague solutions”
A key theme in the discussion is the threat of what Gupta calls a “vague resolution” – a ceasefire or partial understanding that allows each side to declare victory without resolving the problem. underlying issues.
He says Trump can claim he “polarized Iran and won the war”, while Iran can claim it stood as “the world’s greatest power for almost four months”, effectively keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed and averting regime change. Everyone can present the outcome as a victory for the story. But this does not make this area safe.
The real danger appears the day US forces withdraw from the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea. Gupta warned that regardless of formal justification, Iran is likely to “go after the Gulf states” whom it holds responsible for its situation. Also, Iran, with uranium enriched to 60%, has the ability to assemble a “dirty bomb” relatively quickly, leaving Israel and the US in a permanent nuclear shadow.
In parallel, the Ukraine–Russia war has flared up again with new intensity, with Ukrainian attacks followed by Russian ballistic missile counter-attacks on Kiev. In such a volatile global environment, Gupta argues, a blurry, half-baked Middle East agreement “is no deal” — and it certainly doesn’t strengthen Trump’s position with his MAGA base at home.
Iran’s radical spectrum and its idea of victory
Part of the complexity lies in Iran’s internal politics. Gupta described the Islamic Republic as a “fundamentalist regime” with several layers: a supreme leader at the top; Then personalities like Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf; Foreign Minister; Self-described “liberal”; and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). However, these are all variations on a hardcore continuum.
For this ecosystem, victory does not mean economic normalization or Western acceptance. It means “America, do not bow before the Great Satan.” As long as Tehran can claim it has preserved its nuclear influence, its regime, and its regional stance, it can present the outcome as a strategic victory domestically – even if sanctions relief and economic revival remain partial.
Rubio in Delhi: Recalibrating an important relationship.
In this backdrop, Marco Rubio’s presence in India holds more than symbolic significance. This is his first visit to India as US Secretary of State, and he is in India for four days – a sign that Washington continues to view the relationship as “a giant” and a globally watched partnership.
Gupta points out that there have been “misunderstandings” and obstacles on both sides on bilateral issues, but that Rubio’s visit creates space to “at least listen to each other”, even if there are no immediate breakthroughs. The agenda is broad:
- Immigration and visa concerns
- Pakistan and cross border terrorism
- China’s assertiveness
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has clearly expressed India’s position: “If you are MAGA, we are India first.” This framework reflects the current phase – one in which convergence is practically leveraged, but New Delhi is evasive about strategic autonomy.
Rubio’s discussion also comes just ahead of a possible meeting between Trump and the prime minister Narendra Modi At the G7 summit in Paris, it was emphasized that the top political leadership of both sides are directly invested in the trajectory of relations.
Role of Quad: Indo-Pacific, not Hormuz
A natural question is whether the Quad – comprising the US, India, Japan and Australia – can play any role in the Strait of Hormuz crisis. Gupta is clear: Quad is limited to the Indo-Pacific and will not be a means of managing Hormuz; This remains a responsibility for the United States and its Middle Eastern allies.
The primary focus areas of the Quad include:
- Maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, where the PLA Navy is expanding and pressure on Taiwan is increasing
- Building alternative global supply chains to reduce excessive dependence on any one country
- Coordinating humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and keeping vital sea routes open, including the emerging Northern Route
Gupta cautioned against oversimplifying the Quad as an anti-China alliance or a mere “talking shop”. “It’s a work in progress,” he says, creating a strategic architecture in which the four democracies can “hold each other’s hand” and push for stability in the Indo-Pacific as other powers seek to expand their naval reach beyond traditional borders.
The upcoming foreign ministers’ meeting in Delhi, which will include Japan’s Motegi, Australia’s Penny Wong, India’s Jaishankar and America’s Rubio, will be another step in shaping this framework. The underlying message – that freedom of navigation cannot be compromised, whether in the South China Sea or, by extension, other significant chokepoints – is one that many in the global South, including India, have a direct interest in reinforcing.
Israel’s existential red line
Verma questioned Israel’s position in a scenario where both Washington and Tehran could claim victory. Gupta’s answer is blunt: Israel cannot accept any deal that preserves the Iranian nuclear threat.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has told Trump that the war “will not end” until Iran gives up its enriched uranium and the ability to move toward a nuclear weapon. For Israel, this is not a bargain but a matter of survival, given that Iran has repeatedly declared its ambition to destroy the Jewish state.
Israel’s maximum demands would be that Iran hand over its enriched uranium to the US or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and pledge not to produce nuclear weapons for a specified period – a decade or two. In Netanyahu’s view, anything short of serious reductions in Iran’s nuclear capabilities is a non-solution Israel cannot support.
In other words, any “vague” ceasefire or political settlement bypassing the nuclear core would not only destabilize the Middle East and destabilize oil markets; This would leave Israel feeling exposed and abandoned, along with an incentive to act unilaterally.
Overall, the negotiations paint a world where headlines about an “impending deal” hide a very messy reality. The real struggle now is not over who can claim victory, but over whether the agreements made in the back rooms will be swift and credible enough to prevent the next crisis from being worse than the last.
