The overall process of elections has been described by various analysts as a means of maintaining the status quo established by the 2021 coup. This phased approach in a way accepted the reality that the army’s territorial reach was limited and only 21% of the country was under firm control. Phase I (December 28, 2025) covered 102 townships, with priority given to Nay Pyi Taw Capital Region, Yangon and Mandalay. Phase II (January 11, 2026) expanded to 100 townships in 12 states and territories. This phase was marked by significant destruction, with resistance forces launching simultaneous attacks in at least 10 townships. Ultimately, the third phase (January 25, 2026) covered 63 constituencies. The result claimed a 55% turnout, but this was much lower than 2020’s turnout of 70%.

Despite claims of inclusivity, the military was forced to cancel voting in 65 townships, about 20% of the country. Additionally, Union Election Commission (UEC) data indicated that 3,995 specific areas, including 3,772 village localities and 223 wards, were completely excluded from the phases due to active fighting. The elections saw the deployment of 50,000 Myanmar Electronic Voting Machines (MEVMs), locally developed units that replaced paper ballots. While the MEVM was claimed to be a modernization effort, internal risks acknowledged in state media included infrastructure demands (constant power) and the machines’ susceptibility to manipulation.

The elections were conducted through a repressive legal framework. The Political Party Registration Law, introduced in January 2023, and the Law on the Protection of Multi-Party Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction, adopted in July 2025, were comprehensive laws barring 40 political parties from participating in elections, as well as criminalizing and controlling the flow of information. And enforcement of this law was accompanied by complete intolerance for dissent. By the end of voting, more than 229 individuals were formally prosecuted and more than 400 were detained.

The dissolution of the 41 parties cleared the field for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Only six parties were eligible to contest elections nationwide, leaving voters with limited options. As a result, the USDP, led by U Khin Yi, claimed a landslide victory, securing 232 out of 263 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) and 109 out of 157 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house).

This was also ensured through the introduction of a mixed member proportional (MMP) system for the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house), which used a combination of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) to favor smaller ethnic military-aligned proxies such as the Mon Unity Party (MUP), the Arakan Front Party (AFP), and the Zomi National Party (ZNP). Was. Other smaller parties, such as the Kayah State People’s Party, Kayin National Democratic Party, Danu Nationalities Democracy Party, Rakhine Nationalities Party and the Naga National Party gained one seat each in the upper house. Therefore, by moving away from the FPTP in the upper house, the Sena ensured that the ethnic vote would be divided among local parties rather than coming together for the national opposition and also project an image of multi-party democracy and inclusivity, even if the USDP retained a decisive majority.

However, despite this managed process, local ethnic voting patterns in some areas challenged the military-staged figures. For example, in Taunggyi, Nan Kyin of the Pa-O National Organization (PNO) defeated Lieutenant-General Aung Aung, a leading figure of the USDP. The Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) gained a number of seats in the lower house in both rounds. The formation of the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA) signaled a strategic shift towards operational unity just before the elections began. The alliance includes 19 important groups, such as the 96 Soldier PDF, the Magway PDF, and the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), which acts as a “mobile bridge” between eastern ethnic allies and the central Bamar heartland. Additionally, resistance remained concentrated in the Bamar-majority “dry zone” (Sagaing and Magway). These groups have refused military control over agricultural centers and disrupted vital north-south supply routes along the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers. Also on the western border, the Arakan Army (AA) maintains complete dominance in Rakhine and controls 14 out of 17 townships. Simultaneously, the Chin Brotherhood and the Kalay Revolution Force have secured routes along the Chin-Saing border, maintaining vital supply lines from the Indian border. The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) control the strategic plateaus, effectively encircling Nay Pyi Taw from the east and disrupting access to the mineral-rich northern areas.

The international community is sharply divided between non-recognition and practical engagement. This realignment reflects changing patterns in a multi-polar world, where interests in stability or resources outweigh democratic norms. To legitimize the results of the elections, the military recruited an elite group of international observers to create a positive narrative that the voting was “orderly,” “free and fair” and independently conducted. These were mainly from countries that have maintained diplomatic relations with the regime, i.e. Russia, China, Belarus and Nicaragua. There was representation from the Indian side. Even though the ASEAN bloc declined to send observers, individual countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia participated in the process.

It is important to note that China pursues a dual-track diplomacy, providing economic grants under the BRI to the military while maintaining ties with the KIA and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to protect its rare earth supplies and the Kyaukfu deep sea port. Myanmar is strategically located as the third-largest producer of rare earth minerals, which are mainly found in the conflict-stricken Kachin State. This has increased geopolitical competition and interference from external forces. Russia, since the military takeover in 2021, has emerged as a strategic supplier of jet fuel and weapons and drones to the military. Regionally, ASEAN as a bloc could not bring Myanmar back under its fold and Malaysia and the Philippines flatly refused to recognize the election results, noting the failure of the five-point consensus.

Sharing a 1643 long land border and maritime border, India has attempted to balance its Act East policy with border security. India has attempted to balance its strategic interests, border security and infrastructure projects by adopting a two-track policy. This approach includes engaging with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and opposition groups, particularly the Arakan Army and Chin groups, to secure border stability and counter China’s influence, as well as maintaining state-level engagement with the military and now its elected party USDP to safeguard connectivity projects. Continued engagement is necessary to prevent Myanmar from complete isolation, which would push it further into China’s sphere of influence.

The military’s attempt to win over 80% of the USDP’s seats through the 2025-26 elections and plan a political transition with a predetermined outcome by excluding opposition and manipulating the legal framework has apparently won the show. Even as the country now prepares to call for a new Hluttaw in March 2026, the country remains a theater of “managed chaos.” As elections were announced and held across the country, many areas faced high-intensity warfare. More than 3.3 million people are internally displaced, and 18.6 million are in need of immediate assistance. During the elections themselves, at least 170 civilians were killed in air strikes and approximately 400 arrests were made.

The 2025-2026 elections have achieved strategic integration in the central and urban core but at the cost of permanent fragmentation on the periphery. And while it is now accepted that the troop standoff continues, international and regional players must act as facilitators to ensure that the violence stops, a ceasefire is signed and implemented, and a national dialogue is initiated. The fight led by opposition forces must uphold the norms of federal democracy in Myanmar as well as demand equal representation in the political process.

This article is written by Chhavi Vashishtha, Associate Fellow, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.